Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

State of Utah v. Michael Damon Henderson : Reply
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Nathan
Lyon; Deputy Weber County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellant.
Ryan J. Bushell; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Henderson, No. 20060477 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6544

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON,

Case No. 20060477-CA

Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

MARIAN DECKER (5688)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
RYAN J. BUSHELL
298 24th Street, Suite 230
Ogden,Utah 84401

NATHAN LYON
Deputy Weber County Attorney

Attorney for Appellee

Attorneys for Appellant

DEC

T= COURTS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON,

Case No. 20060477-CA

Defendant/Appellee.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

MARIAN DECKER (5688)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
RYAN J. BUSHELL
298 24th Street, Suite 230
Ogden,Utah 84401

NATHAN LYON
Deputy Weber County Attorney

Attorney for Appellee

Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

REPLY TO POINT I OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-6 (West 2004) PROVIDES AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND
FOR AFFIRMANCE IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED AND LACKS MERIT
1
A.
B.

Defendant's Assertion of an Alternative Ground for Affirmance Does Not
Comply With the Briefing Rule

2

The Record Does Not Support Defendant's Assertion of a Statutory
Violation

5

REPLY TO POINT II OF DEFENDANTS BRIEF: POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE
TO BELIEVE THAT AN INTOXICATED DEFENDANT MAY ENDANGER
HIMSELF OR ANOTHER IN A PUBLIC PLACE
7
A. Police Had Probable Cause to Believe That Defendant May Endanger
Himself or Another
B.
C.

Police Had Probable Cause to Believe That Defendant's Intoxication
Occurred in a Public Pace
Defendant's Reliance on State v. Trane Is Misplaced

CONCLUSION

9

11
12
15

NO ADDENDUM NECESSARY

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Brigham City v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct 1943 (2006)
Devenpeckv. Alford, 543 U.S. 146(2004)

11, 12, 14
11, 14

Michiganv. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006)

4

Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978)

11

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

11
STATE CASES

MacKayv. Hardy, 973 P.2d941 (Utah 1998)
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)

2
2, 4

State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d 1108

2

State v. Holm, 2006 \JT 31, 137P.3d726

8, 12

State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d404 (Utah 1999)

4

State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992)

3

State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120 (Utah App. 1997)

2

State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998)

4

State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 76 P.3d 1159

5

State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, 57 P.3d 1052

passim

State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989)
State v. fTarren, 2003 UT 36

2,4
11

ii

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §76-9-701 (West 2004)

7

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-6 (West 2004)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (West 2004)

3

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-212 (West 2004)

3

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
M \ I ! o r I .' \!T,

:

I'l .nihil'' \|,|n lh.it,

:

v.
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, :
Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 20060477-CA

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

REPLY TO POINT I OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM THAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-6 (West 2004) PROVIDES
AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND FOR AFFIRMANCE IS
TN ADF QU ATET ,Y BRIEFED AND LACKS MERIT
!n Coin! 1 nl'liis brief, e!e!l ixlant concedes that the "Fourth Amendment does not
require the police to notify arrestees of charges, let alone that they are under arrest.
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S 146 [] (2004)." Aple. Br. at 8. However, he asserts that
l h All CODE ANN & // ,'' o( I ) { West ..!()() I), pr<i\'i(ies ;m ,'ilteniatne gron/ui lor al I inning
the trial court's suppression ruling because it "requires an officer making an arrest to
inform the person being arrested of his intention, cause, and authority to arrest him."
Aple. Br. at 8. Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed and lacks merit.

A.

Defendant's Assertion of an Alternative Ground for Affirmance
Does Not Comply With the Briefing Rule.

Rules 24(a)(9), & 24(b) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, require an appellee to
present his "contentions and reasons .. . with respect to the issues presented/5 including
"citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." This Court should
not address issues inadequately briefed under this rule. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT
44, Tf 6, 1 P.3d 1108 (refusing to consider argument which was inadequately brief);
MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Utah 1998) (same). Indeed, Utah courts have
consistently held that issues not properly briefed should not be addressed on appeal. See
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). This is because c"[a] reviewing court
is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited.'" State v.
Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 130 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450
(Utah 1988)).
As noted above, defendant concedes that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred
here, but suggests there is an alternative ground for affirmance under Section 77-7-6(1),
governing the manner of arrest. Aple. Br. at 8. However, even assuming defendant could
show a violation of section 77-7-6(1) on these facts, his brief is devoid of any analysis
regarding the propriety of suppression as a remedy. See Aple. Br. at 8-9. The
suppression remedy defendant seeks is not a given. Indeed, no section within Chapter 7
of the Utah Code, including section 77-7-6, provides for the remedy of suppression. If
the legislature intended suppression to be a remedy for violations of its laws governing
2

arrest in Chapter 7, it would have so indicated, as it did in Chapter 23, governing search
and administrative warrants. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-212 (West 2004) (requiring
suppression of evidence seized "pursuant to a search warrant" where the "unlawful
conduct of the peace officer is shown to be substantial," meaning the search warrant "was
obtained with malicious purpose and without probable cause or was executed maliciously
and willfully beyond the authority of the warrant or with unnecessary severity").
Moreover, neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has considered whether
a violation of any section in Chapter 7 warrants suppression, let alone section 77-7-6
itself. While Utah's courts have considered whether violations of Utah's knock and
announce statute warrant suppression, there is no per se rule.1 Rather, suppression is
deemed an appropriate remedy for violations of the knock and announce rule only where
the violation arises "to a fundamental violation of Fourth Amendment rights," or where
"it demonstrates prejudice to the defendant or a lack of good faith on the part of the
police." State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah 1992) (holding that "[t]he erroneous
addition of nighttime authority in the search warrant... did not rise to a fundamental
violation of Fourth Amendment rights, but merely constituted a procedural violation of
Section 77-23-5"). A violation of the knock and announce statute is not prejudicial unless
"the search would not otherwise have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the

!

The knock and announce statute was renumbered in 1994 and is currently found at
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-210 (West 2004).
3

[r]ule had been followed." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Violations of the
Fourth Amendment's knock and announce rule do not require suppression. Michigan v.
Hudson,\26 S.Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006) (upholding lower court's refusal to suppress
evidence obtained following a violation of knock and announce rule, holding that "the
social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations are
considerable," while "the incentive to such violations is minimal.. . and the extant
deterrences against them are substantial").
Defendant's failure to engage in any analysis regarding the propriety of
suppression as a remedy for the statutory violation he alleges here is a sufficient ground
upon which to reject his claim that section 77-7-6(1) provides an alternative ground for
affirmance. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (holding "rule 24(a)(9)
requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned
analysis based on that authority"); Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (holding argument "must
contain some support for each contention"). Indeed, this Court is not a "'a depository in
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v.
Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404, 410 (Utah 1999) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah
1988)); see also Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. Accordingly, defendant's claim should be
rejected. See Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 410 (refusing to consider appellant's claim due to the
lack of meaningful analysis of cited authority); Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (refusing to

4

address claim on appeal where brief "wholly [lacked] legal analysis and authority to
support his argument").
R.

The Record Does Not Support Defendant's Assertion of a
Statutory Violation.

In any event, the record does not support defendant's claim of a statutory violation.
Before an appellate court may affirm the decision appealed from on an alternative ground,
that ground must be "'apparent on the record,'" and "it must also be sustainable by the
factual findings of the trial court." State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, % 9, 76 P.3d 1159
(quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^ 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (additional citations omitted)).
Defendant's claim of a statutory violation is neither apparent on the record, nor
sustainable by the trial court's factual findings.
As noted above, section 77-7-6(1) governs the manner of arrest and requires that
the individual effecting arrest "inform" the arrestee "of his intention, cause, and
authority." There are three exceptions to this general requirement:
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger the life or safety of
the officer or another person or will likely enable the party being arrested to
escape;
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the commission of, or
an attempt to commit, an offense; or
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately after the commission
of an offense or an escape.
All of these exceptions arguably apply here.

5

First, under subsection (l)(a), Officer Boots was not required to tell defendant that
he was under arrest because it would have been dangerous to do so. In claiming
otherwise, defendant overlooks unfavorable findings by the trial court. In particular, the
trial court found that defendant responded "that he 'didn't do sh-t'" when police first
approached him, and further found that defendant refused Officer Boots' repeated
requests to remove his hands from his pockets, and instead turned and walked away
before refusing a final command to remove his hands, which behavior caused Officer
Boots to be concerned for his safety. R68-69. Consequently, Officer Boots grabbed
defendant's arm, and when defendant physically resisted, put him in a twist lock and took
defendant to the ground. R69-70. These findings, reflecting defendant's belligerent noncooperation and physical resistance, together with findings demonstrating defendant's
intoxicated condition, see R69-70, demonstrate that Officer Boots could have been
reasonably concerned that telling defendant he was under arrest would only further
escalate an already dangerous situation. See subsection (l)(a).
Second, under subsection (l)(b), Officer Boots was not required to tell defendant
that he was under arrest because, as set out in Appellant's opening brief at pp. 11-14,
defendant had committed at least one offense in the officers' presence, intoxication.2

defendant's claim that police lacked probable cause to arrest him for intoxication
is addressed in the State's Response to Defendant's Point II, infra.
6

Finally, under subsection (l)(c), Officer Boots was not required to tell defendant
that he was under arrest because defendant was "pursued immediately after the
commission of an offense or an escape." As set forth above, at the time Officer Boots
grabbed defendant's arm here, the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for at
least intoxication.3 See Aplt. Br. at 11-14.
Based on the above, defendant's claim that section 77-7-6(1) provides an
alternative ground for affirmance is neither apparent in the record nor sustainable by the
trial court's factual findings. Defendant's assertion that section 77-7-6(1) constitutes an
alternative ground for affirmance should therefore be rejected.

REPLY TO POINT II OF DEFENDANTS BRIEF: POLICE HAD
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT AN INTOXICATED
DEFENDANT MAY ENDANGER HIMSELF OR ANOTHER IN A
PUBLIC PLACE
In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that police lacked probable cause to arrest
him for intoxication. Aple. Br. at 9-13. Defendant disputes that there was probable cause
to believe he had committed intoxication on the grounds that, first, "[he] hadn't
unreasonably disturbed anyone," and second, "there [was] no showing that [he] may have
endangered himself or another." Aple. Br. at 12. Defendant suggests that both are
elements of the intoxication statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-701(1) (West 2004), which

3

See n. 2, supra.
7

must always be proven to establish the crime of intoxication. Id. As will be shown
below, defendant misreads the intoxication statute.
Defendant's contention that the State must always prove both that an intoxicated
person "may endanger himself or another/' and that the intoxicated person also
"unreasonably disturbed] other persons/' Section 76-9-701(1), is resolved under general
principles of statutory construction. The "'primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give
effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose
the statute was meant to achieve.'" State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ^ 16, 137 P.3d 726
(quoting Foutz v. City ofS. Jordan, 2004 UT 75, \ 11, 100 P.3d 1171) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Additionally, it is "'presume[d] that the legislature used each word
advisedly.'"Id (quoting C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, \ 9, 977 P.2d 479 (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Utah's intoxication statute provides that a person commits the crime of
intoxication when that person "is under the influence of alcohol,... to a degree that the
person may endanger himself or another, in a public place or in a private place where he
unreasonably disturbs other persons." Section 76-9-701(1). Notably, the phrase, "where
he unreasonably disturbs other persons," modifies only the immediately preceding phrase,
"private place." Id. Accordingly, the State must show that an intoxicated person
"unreasonably disturb [ed] other persons" only when the intoxication occurs in "a private
place/' as opposed to "a public place." Id.

8

In other words, to obtain a conviction under the intoxication statute, the State must
prove two elements, each of which includes two alternatives or sub-elements. The first
element the State must prove in a prosecution for intoxication is the "danger" element, or
that a person "is under the influence of alcohol,... to a degree that the person may [be a
]danger[.]" Id. The State must then prove one of two sub-elements: the danger was to the
intoxicated person (a) "himself or (b) "another." Id.
The second element the State must show to prove intoxication is the "place"
element, or where the intoxication occurred. This element consists of two sub-elements,
only one of which must be proven: the intoxication occurred (a) "in a public place," or (b)
"in a private place where [the intoxicated person] unreasonably disturbs other persons."
Id. Thus, to obtain an intoxication conviction the State must prove (1) that an intoxicated
person "is under the influence of alcohol... to a degree that the person may endanger"
(a) "himself or" (b) "another," and (2) that the intoxicated person was (a) "in a public
place, or" (b) "in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other persons." Id.
(emphasis added).
A.

Police Had Probable Cause to Believe That Defendant
May Endanger Himself or Another.

Turning first to the "danger" element of the intoxication statute, police here had
probable cause to believe that defendant "may endanger himself or another." Id. Indeed,
as set forth in the response to defendant's Point I, supra, defendant was noisily stumbling
around in the parking lot when he was discovered by police. R68-69. He was also
9

belligerent and uncooperative, and exhibited all the classic signs of intoxication. R69-70.
In addition, police were concerned that defendant may have a weapon, the area was
known for criminal activity, the hour was late, and busy 32nd Street was nearby. In view
of these uncontested facts, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in failing to conclude
that a reasonable person in Officer Boots's place would reasonably be concerned that
defendant may present a danger to himself or others by any number of means, e.g.,
stumbling into oncoming traffic, or initiating or otherwise becoming entangled in an
altercation. See Aplt. Br. at 12-14; see also State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97,ffif37-40, 57
P.3d 1052 (upholding Trane's arrest for intoxication in a public place based on signs of
Trane's physical impairment and belligerent behavior).
Notwithstanding the above, defendant asserts that there is "no record that. ..
Officer Boots was 'reasonably concerned that defendant may stumble into oncoming
traffic," or "that Officer Boots was concerned [ defendant might become 'entangled in a
fight or other crime.5" Aple. Br. at 12 (quoting Aplt. Br. at 14). While Officer Boots did
not articulate these specific concerns, he did testify that 32nd Street was one of the busiest
in that area at night, as well as a high crime vicinity. R90:9, 16, 27. These observations
support that a reasonable officer would be concerned that an obviously intoxicated person
like defendant may be a danger to himself, by stumbling into traffic, or to others, by
fighting. See Aplt. Br. at 12-14. Moreover, given these obvious safety concerns,
defendant's arrest here was reasonable, even if, as defendant suggests, Officer Boots did
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not himself envision them at the time. See State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, % 14 (holding
that reasonableness is determined by asking whether the facts available at the time of the
seizure would "'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken
was appropriate") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). Indeed, it is well
established that the reasonableness of police conduct is judged against an objective
standard. See Brigham City v. Stuart,\26 S.Ct 1943, 1948 (2006) ("An action is
'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of
mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action'" (quoting
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (emphasis added))). See also
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (same).
B.

Police Had Probable Cause to Believe That Defendant's
Intoxication Occurred in a Public Pace.

Turning to the "place" element of the intoxication statute, police also had probable
cause to believe that defendant committed intoxication in "public place," as opposed to a
"private place." Section 76-9-701(1). Indeed, it is undisputed that police encountered
defendant in a public parking lot. R68. This satisfied the second, or "place," element of
the crime.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the State was not required to additionally show
that defendant "unreasonably disturbed others." Section 76-9-701. As set forth above,
this is because the phrase, "where he unreasonably disturbs other persons," modifies only
the immediately preceding phrase, "private place." Id. Thus, the State need show that the
11

defendant "unreasonably disturbed others" only when the intoxication occurs in a "private
place," as opposed to a "public place." Id.
This is a correct interpretation of the intoxication statute; otherwise, there would
have been no need for the legislature to distinguish between public and private places.
For example, under the plain language of the statute, the legislature intended that an
intoxicated person "in a public place" be subject to arrest whenever he "may endanger
himself or another." Id. On the other hand, an intoxicated person "in a private place" is
not subject to arrest until his behavior also "unreasonably disturbs other persons." Id.
See, e.g., Stuart, 126 S.Ct. at 1949 (holding that officers' warrantless entry of home was
"plainly reasonable under the circumstances," where police "were responding, at 3
o'clock in the morning, to complaints about a loud party"). The State's interpretation
thus "give[s] full effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Holm, 2006 UT 31,^16
(quotation marks and case citation omitted).
C.

Defendant's Reliance on State v. Trane Is Misplaced.

Notwithstanding the above, defendant cites State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, 57 P.3d
1052, asserting that the Utah Supreme Court there required the State to establish both that
Trane may have endangered himself or another, and that he also unreasonably disturbed
others. Aple. Br. at 12. Defendant's reliance on Trane is misplaced.
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Defendant's suggestion, that to convict for intoxication, the State must prove that
he may have endangered himself or another, and that he also unreasonably disturbed
others, is based on the supreme court's paraphrasing of the intoxication statute in Trane:
"A person commits the crime of public intoxication under the Utah Code when that
person 'is under the influence of alcohol... to a degree that the person may endanger
himself or another, in a public place . . . where he unreasonably disturbs other persons.'"
Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 37 (quoting Section 76-9-701(1) (ellipsis in Trane)), Based on the
supreme court's use of ellipsis, defendant suggests the supreme court read the
intoxication statute in Trane as being conjunctive rather than disjunctive, or as requiring
the State to always prove both that the intoxicated person in a public place may endanger
himself or others and that the intoxicated person unreasonably disturbed others. See
Aple. Br. at 12 ("Of importance to this case is the Court's listing of the elements of public
intoxication.").
However, Trane never asserted that the State had to prove that he unreasonably
disturbed others. Specifically, like defendant, Trane's intoxication occurred in a public
parking lot. Id. at \ 38. Unlike defendant, however, Trane challenged his arrest solely on
the ground that there was no probable cause to believe that he had endangered himself or
another. Id. at f 15. The supreme court rejected Trane's challenge, observing that police
reasonably feared for their safety, given their experience that intoxicated persons could
become violent. Id. at ^40. Additionally, Trane's behavior was "angry," and
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"uncooperative." Id. Trane "had 'puffed his chest out [and] took a defensive posture
similar to a boxer/ and initially would not release his identification card" to police. Id.
Accordingly, the supreme court held that police correctly concluded Trane was
intoxicated enough to pose a danger to himself or others. Id.
Based on the above, the question of whether the phrase, "where he unreasonably
disturbs other persons," modifies only "private place" or both "private place" and "public
place" was not before the supreme court in Trane. Id. at % 15. Therefore, any possible
suggestion in Trane that Utah's intoxication statute requires the State to prove the
"unreasonably disturbs" sub-element of section 76-9-701(1), regardless of whether the
intoxication occurrs in a "public place or a private place," is dicta. And, as further set
forth above, it is also contrary to the plain meaning of the statutory language.
Defendant's claim that the State had to establish that he was disturbing others even if his
conduct occurred in a public place finds no support in Trane.
In sum, given defendant's belligerent non-compliance and physical signs of
intoxication while in a parking lot, see Aplt. Br. at 12-13, police had probable cause to
believe that he may have "endangered himself or another[] in a public place." Section 769-701(1). See also Trane, 2002 UT 97,ffi[37-40; Stuart,l26 S.Ct. at 1948; Devenpeck,
543 U.S. at 153. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding otherwise.

14

CONCLUSION
The trial court's erroneous suppression of the drug evidence should be reversed.
This case should be remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate the dismissed
charges and to allow the prosecution to proceed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on /^December 2006.
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Assistant Attorney General
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